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Abstract—The cost of a zero-day network worm outbreak has been estimated 
to be up to US$2.6 billion. Additionally zeroday network worm outbreaks have 
been observed that spread at a significant pace across the global Internet, with 
an observed infection level of more than 90 percent of vulnerable hosts within 
10 minutes. The threat posed by such fast-spreading malware is therefore 
significant, particularly given the fact that network operator / administrator 
intervention is not likely to take effect within the typical epidemiological 
timescale of such infections. This paper presents a classification of wormable 
vulnerabilities, demonstrating a method to determine if a vulnerability is 
wormable, and presents a survey into the cause of the reduction of worm 
outbreaks in recent years, as well as their viability in the future. It then goes 
on to explore recent wormable vulnerabilities, and points out the issues with 
operating system security in relation to techniques used by zero-day worms. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
As a type of malware that exploits vulnerabilities that have not been patched or 
acknowledged at the point of an outbreak, with an automatic propagation method 
that can spread pervasively throughout a network, zero-day worms are particularly 
virulent. The effects are exacerbated by either a lack of detection or a high speed of 
propagation [1]. The threat presented by such malware to the Internet, national 
security and defence systems is therefore significant. 
 
In the first few years of the twenty-first century, there were a number of notable zero-
day worm outbreaks [2][3][4] however, since these events the number of zero-day 
worm outbreaks has reduced. Understanding this reduction, and assessing whether 
such worm outbreaks are still viable in a modern setting are essential. This paper 
presents a discussion of historical worm events to ascertain why they occurred, and 
then discusses the motivations for malware attacks to assess why worm outbreaks 
have seen this reduction. The paper then presents a discussion on recent wormable 
vulnerabilities and operating system security, in order to assess whether zero-day 
worm outbreaks are still viable on the modern Internet.  
 
The remainder of this paper is presented as follows: Section II presents a lexicon as 
a definition of terms. Section III presents related work, focusing on similar studies 
into the assessment of potential threats. Section IV presents a discussion on the 
motivations for carrying out a malware attack. Sections V and VI present a summary 
of recent wormable vulnerabilities, and addressing the particular issue of operating 
system security. Finally, the paper is concluded in Section VII. 
 
II. LEXICON 
 
A lexicon has been presented for the clarification of the following terms, owing to 
their specific use in this paper. 
 
Zero-Day Worm: In this paper, this is defined as a type of malicious software that 
propagates automatically without human interaction, using a vulnerability that has 
not been patched or widely acknowledged at the point of an outbreak. In particular, 
this paper reports findings on fast, random-scanning worms [5]. This is a similar 
definition to the taxonomy described by Weaver et al. [6], and other published 
literature (see [2][3][4]). 
 
Wormable Vulnerability: A vulnerability that has the potential for use in worm 
propagation, as defined by being network accessible, allowing the execution of 
arbitrary code and whether a not a vulnerability can be exploited remotely. This is in 
accordance with the model reported by Nazario et al. [7]. 
 
III. RELATED WORK 
 
Research into worms and their outbreaks has been reported in three key areas: the 
classification of worms and wormable vulnerabilities, potential worm outbreak 
scenarios and the investigation of previous worm outbreaks. In addition, this paper 
also considers contemporary malware threats. 
 
A. Classification of Worms and Wormable Vulnerabilities 
 
The taxonomy reported by Weaver et al. [6] presents an overall method of classifying 
worms. The classification is made under the following categories: target discovery, 
propagation method, activation, payloads, motivations and attackers. Similar 
categories are reported by Li et al. [8], which classified worms under a number of 
schemes: target finding, propagation, transmission and payload. Smith et al. [9] also 
uses the taxonomy reported by Weaver, however, expands this further to consider 
evasion and detection methods, which incorporate different propagation methods 
and payloads. For the purposes of this paper, we choose to focus on self-carried 
worms, or worms that do not require other network traffic in order to propagate. 
 
Another factor of classifying worms is the vulnerability they exploit in order to 
propagate. As reported by Nazario et al. [7], a wormable vulnerability can be 
summarised in (1), where wormability, W, is a product of the exploit characteristics, 
E, population characteristics, P, and the time since the disclosure of the vulnerability 
to account for development of the worm. Nazario et al. also defines the characteristics 
of a wormable exploit, as shown in (2), where the exploit characteristics, E, are 
defined by the fractional population of exploit architecture, fEp, the fractional 
availability of an exploit for a given vulnerability, fEa, the number of chances available 
to attempt an exploit, Ec, the fraction of exploit reliability, fEr , the Boolean value of 
whether the exploit is able to be made remotely, R, if the impact of the vulnerability 
is execution of code, Ie and if the impact of the vulnerability permits network access, 
In. 
 
W = E _ P _ L  (1) 
 
E = fEp (fEa + 0:067) (Ec – 1+ fEr )RIeIn (2) 
            Ec  
 
Using the key factors reported by Nazario et al., and those reported by Weaver et al., 
Li et al., and Smith et al., a wormable vulnerability can be summarised in the Boolean 
equation (3), where a wormable vulnerability, Vw, is determined by not requiring 
human interaction, H, is network reachable, Nr, provides remote code execution, R, 
and provides network access, Na once exploited. 
 
Vw = _H_ Nr _ R _ Na  (3) 
 
 
In addition to the reported work that provides a classification, there are also a 
number of resources that focus on providing details for known vulnerabilities. One 
such source is the Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) system [10], which 
provide details for a range of vulnerabilities. The CVE system notes the access vector, 
for instance if the vulnerability is network reachable or requires human interaction, 
and the impact if the vulnerability were to be exploited, for instance providing remote 
code execution or network access. These details provide information in order to 
assess whether a vulnerability is wormable. 
 
B. Potential Worm Outbreak Scenarios 
 
Potential worm outbreak scenarios often focus on new technologies or methods that 
a worm may use in order to spread faster. As far as the authors are aware, the first 
notable instance of this was the work reported by Weaver in 2001 [11], which 
described a Warhol worm - where using a combination of a list of known vulnerable 
hosts, known as a hitlist, and by dividing up how each worm scans for new 
susceptible hosts, known as permutation scanning, the worm increases in virulence. 
Such methods were seen in the Witty outbreak of 2003 [4], and the second version 
of Code Red, Code Red II, in 2001, respectively. 
 
Work reported by Staniford et al. [12], presents results on the impact of very fast, 
what is termed as Flash worms, on a contemporary Internet as of 2004. Using 
simulation, Staniford estimates that an optimised Flash worm could spread within 
seconds. Similar fast outbreaks are further corroborated in work reported by Tidy et 
al. [13], as well as reporting work on other potential scenarios in [5], where a worm 
uses an intentionally slow phase before switching to a fast, random-scanning method 
in order to increase the number of infected hosts prior to its fast phase; resulting in 
an impact similar to having a hitlist. 
 
The work in potential worm outbreaks assume that a wormable vulnerability exists, 
however, there is limited work in investigating contemporary vulnerabilities in order 
to determine if they are wormable, and the possible worm outbreaks that could occur. 
 
 
 
C. Previous Worm Outbreaks 
 
There have been a number of large-scale zero-day worm outbreaks, most notable of 
which are the Morris Worm outbreak of 1988 [14], the Code Red outbreak of 2001 
[2], the Slammer outbreak of 2003 [3] and Witty outbreak of 2004 [4]. Table I 
summarises these worms, detailing the platform/service that had the wormable 
vulnerability, the port/s used for propagation, and the exploit method. This shows 
that these notable events all used a buffer overflow in order to infect susceptible 
hosts, propagated using different ports and exploited vulnerabilities on a number of 
different platforms. 
 
Another reported characteristic of these worm outbreaks centre around their 
payload. Both the Morris and Slammer worms contained no destructive or directly 
malicious content as part of its payload. Similarly, the Code Red worm only began to 
undertake a denial of service attack after it had completed a propagation phase. As 
reported by Shannon and Moore [4], the Witty worm was the first to carry a 
destructive payload, overwriting randomly chosen sections of the infected hosts hard 
drive with the phrase “(^.^) insert witty message here (^.^)”. 
 
Owing to the lack of malicious payload in the Slammer worm, the intentional pause 
in propagation in the Code Red worm and as the Morris worm was described by its 
author to be designed to gauge the size of the ARPANET, it can be argued that the 
motivation to release these worms was one of discovery. Similarly, as the Witty worm 
was the first of these to carry a destructive payload, it could have been released to 
assess whether a destructive payload was feasible. 
 
 
TABLE I 
SUMMARY OF NOTABLE WORM CHARACTERISTICS 
 
Name   Vulnerable Platform/Service   Port/s    Exploit Method 
Morris  DECX Sun 3, sendmail finger   25,79     Buffer overflow 
Code Red  Microsoft IIS web service    80     Buffer overflow 
Slammer  Microsoft SQL Server 2000   1434     Buffer overflow 
Witty   Internet Security Systems firewall  Random    Buffer overflow                                   
 
D. Contemporary Malware Threats 
 
Since the large outbreaks at the beginning of the 21st century, the number of large-
scale worm outbreaks has decreased significantly. Panda Security [15] reports that 
worms only constituted approximately 6% of all malware infections in the first 
quarter of 2013, it is also reported that trojans constitute the majority of the malware 
infections with 80% of all malware infections being of this type. One of the largest of 
these is the Zeus trojan [16], which is designed in order to commit fraud 
by gaining access to banking details on infected hosts and sending these details to 
the attacker. This is defined by Wilson [17] as cybercrime, or criminal activity that is 
“enabled by, or that targets computers”. 
 
A return to worm-like characteristics can be seen in the Stuxnet [18] outbreak, which 
targeted industrial control systems in order to cause damage. It is suggested that 
Stuxnet is an example of cyberwarfare [19], where the intent was to cause damage 
to the targeted industrial systems. This is a distinct difference in the cybercriminal 
activity, as instead of criminal gain the motivation of released Stuxnet was one of 
causing damage. 
 
IV. MOTIVATIONS FOR MALWARE ATTACKS 
 
One of the main factors in understanding malware outbreaks is the motivation of the 
attacker. A difference in motivation can influence the choice of malware that an 
attacker will choose, given that different malware is more effective at certain tasks 
than others. In the case of worm outbreaks, this is demonstrated by the reduction 
in events, owing to a change in the motivation of attackers. Figure 1 illustrates this 
change, plotting the trend of worm prevalence against time, along with three 
categories of attacker motivation: experimentation or discovery, cybercrime and 
cyberwarfare. 
 
Up to the first few years of the 21st century, the use of malware was comparatively 
in its infancy, and the notable worm outbreaks during this period can be argued to 
have been for experimental purposes, with the main motivation of the attacker to see 
if they are feasible; or in the case of the Morris worm to measure the size of the 
ARPANET. From around 2004 onward, the use of malware for cybercrime has 
increased. Such criminal activity, as shown by the prevalence of Trojans like Zeus 
[16], has focused on gaining access to confidential data or disrupting services, such 
as a Distributed Denial-of- Service attack (DDoS) [20], through the use of controlling 
a large number of machines through a botnet created using a trojan. 
 
Although worms can be used in order to create botnets and carry out DDoS attacks, 
other methods have been chosen by attackers. Part of the reasoning for this, is that 
a large-scale, fast random-scanning worm outbreak is easily detectable, and it is 
often the intent of an attacker to avoid detection for as long as possible. Additionally, 
as has been shown by the Slammer outbreak [3], there is the possibility that a 
particularly fast worm can impede the network traffic, that in the case of a botnet, 
may disrupt the ability of an attacker to issue commands to or receive information 
from infected hosts. 
 
As it has been shown by the worm-like Stuxnet outbreak [18], if it is the intention of 
an attacker to cause damage then the use of worms becomes a more attractive option. 
Although these have been isolated to targeted attacks to date, if it is the intention of 
an attack to disrupt communication or target the network infrastructure, such as in 
a cyberwarfare scenario, then the use of worms becomes a much more viable option. 
Additionally, if the motivation of an attack is to cause disruption of the Internet, then 
worms also present a viable option for attackers, even in the absence of a payload 
that causes damage.  
 
Given the further shift of motivation from cybercrime to cyberwarfare, this also 
depends on the existence of wormable vulnerabilities, in order to exploit and carry 
worm attacks in the future. 
 
V. RECENT WORMABLE VULNERABILITIES 
 
Equation 3 presents a method of assessing whether or not a vulnerability is 
wormable. This Section presents five case studies of contemporary wormable 
vulnerabilities, along with their CVE code [10] for reference. 
 
Microsoft Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) - 13/03/2012 - CVE-2012-0002 
 
The Microsoft RDP is a method for users to remotely access Windows-based hosts 
across a network. This vulnerability was present in a number of Windows versions, 
including XP, Vista, 7, Server 2003 and Server 2008. This allows an attacker to 
send a crafted packet on port 3389 to the host running RDP, and then potentially 
gain remote code execution. Having gained access to execute remote code, the 
attacker could then use this to send copies of the malicious packet. 
 
This wormable vulnerability is of particular note owing to the potentially large 
number of susceptible hosts to such an attack. W3Counter [21] reports that these 
recent editions of Windows constituted of approximately 3 billion Internet connected 
hosts in 2012. As RDP is disabled by default, this requires being enabled manually. 
One estimate for the number of RDP enabled hosts is one in every 10,000 [22], or 
300,000 hosts; resulting in a similar proportion of vulnerable hosts to the Code Red 
outbreak in 2001. As has been reported in two of the authors previous work [5], such 
a large proportion of susceptible hosts could result in a particularly virulent worm 
outbreak. 
 
BigAnt Message Server - 09/01/2013 - CVE-2012-6275 
 
The BigAnt instant messaging (IM) software is an instant messaging solution targeted 
towards business use. By using a buffer overflow present in the message server 
portion of the software, an attacker is able to send a crafted packet and execute 
remove code on the targeted machine. As the software links with Microsoft Active 
Directory, this can include ascertaining user account details, potentially having a 
wider impact than just the host running the message server. This can also lead to 
network access, allowing copies of the malicious packet to be sent to other hosts 
running the message server software. Although lacking the install base of the 
Microsoft RDP vulnerability, this is of particular note owing to its use in a corporate 
setting, as well as potentially allowing access to further details that could lead to 
further issues. This vulnerability, as far as the authors are aware, also has yet to be 
patched and details of how to exploit this vulnerability are publicly available. 
 
VMWare vCenter - 25/04/2013 - VMSA-2013-0006.1 
 
VMWare vCenter is a management platform for virtualised hosts. A number of CVEs 
reported under the VMWare security advisory VMSA-2013-006.1 [23] detail how an 
attacker may leverage Microsoft Active Directory integration in order to gain 
authentication on Windows-based servers running vCenter (CVE-2013-3107), and 
then use this authentication in order to execute remote code using another 
vulnerability (CVE-2013-3079). This access provides administrative privileges to the 
host system, enabling the attacker to then send copies of the malicious packet/s 
used to other susceptible hosts. As one of the largest vendors for virtualisation 
software, a vulnerability in VMWare software presents a scenario where a substantial 
number of hosts may be susceptible to an attack. Furthermore, access to the 
virtualisation environment may further allow access to the virtualised hosts that are 
currently running on it. This vulnerability has since been patched by VMware, 
however, it demonstrates that virtualisation can present a vulnerability for future 
worm outbreaks. 
 
ASUS RT-AC66U Router - 26/07/2013 - CVE-2013-4659 
 
The ASUS RT-AC66U router is a router produced for the consumer and small office 
market. Using a vulnerability in the Broadcom ACSD service allows an attacker to 
send a crafted packet on port 5916 causing a buffer overflow. This allows 
administrative access on the target device, providing remote code execution and the 
ability for the router to send copies of the malicious packet to other susceptible hosts. 
As far as the authors are aware, no known patch is available for this vulnerability 
and proof of concepts are currently available. 
 
This vulnerability demonstrates that not only do server and desktop hosts require 
consideration when considering potential worm outbreaks, but also that of routing 
infrastructure. In addition to gaining access to further propagate itself, 
administrative access to the router may also allow for further attacks, including man-
in-the-middle or denial of service attacks against hosts connecting to the Internet 
through this router. 
 
systemd 208 and prior - 20/09/2013 - CVE-2013-4391 
 
Designed specifically for Linux-based operating systems, systemd is a system 
management service, or daemon, that forms part of the Linux startup process. By 
using a crafted packet, a buffer overflow can be cause resulting in allowing remote 
code execution. In addition with another vulnerability, CVE-2013-4394 [10], 
administrative access can be gained, therefore allowing network access to send 
copies of the malicious packet/s to other susceptible hosts. This vulnerability 
demonstrates that other operating systems, aside from Windows, can also be subject 
to a wormable vulnerability. It also demonstrates that software required by an 
operating system for basic functionality, as opposed to additional functionality in the 
case of the Microsoft RDP vulnerability, can also be vulnerable. 
 
A. Host Discovery 
 
As highlighted in the work reported by Shannon et al. [4] and Staniford et al. [12], 
the use of a hitlist is one key method of increasing the virulence of a worm outbreak. 
Given that a number of unpatched vulnerabilities have been highlighted, it is of note 
that there now exist a number of services that catalogue information provided 
through the use of meta-data. One such service, Shodan [24], is freely available and 
allows the collated download of search results at a small price. Such a service could 
be used in order to collate information prior to a worm outbreak, in order to create a 
hitlist. 
 
B. Susceptible Population 
 
A key factor in determining the virulence of a worm is the number of susceptible 
hosts that a worm can infect. As has been demonstrated in some of the authors 
previous work [5][13], and the measure of exploitability by Nazario et al. [7], the 
larger the proportion of susceptible hosts on a network both virulence and 
exploitability increase. In the case studies presented, those vulnerabilities that 
would provide the greatest number of susceptible hosts, are vulnerabilities in 
operating systems. Therefore, it is pertinent to further investigate operating system 
security. 
 
VI. OPERATING SYSTEM SECURITY 
 
A. Operating System Memory Security 
 
The main method for exploited vulnerable hosts, allowing for remote code 
execution, has been the use of buffer overflow exploits (as demonstrated in table I). 
This has prompted the development of a number of techniques in order to prevent 
the writing of arbitrary data in the memory addresses that are being used by a 
program; and therefore providing remote code execution. The prevention techniques 
that are widely adopted in modern day operating systems are Address Space Layout 
Randomisation (ASLR), Data Execution Prevention (DEP), using No eXecution (NX) 
and canaries. 
1) Address Space Layout Randomisation: ASLR is a countermeasure mechanism 
[25] adopted by operating systems to randomize the positions of executable code and 
data in memory at each run of a program. Randomising the base address of 
important memory structures, such as the stack and heap, makes the virtual 
address needed to perform a controlflow hijacking attack unknown. However, some 
techniques [26][27] have been reported that can bypass the randomness of ASLR 
mechanism. 
a) Non-ASLR Memory: A non-ASLR module that runs on ASLR enabled operating 
system can be used to circumvent the ASLR protection mechanism. This can be a 
shared library in Microsoft Windows compiled without ASLR support for 
compatibility reasons. When an application that is non-ASLR is executed, the 
application tends to load its executables at runtime at a fixed memory address, thus 
allowing critical memory sections to be overwritten, or changing memory location. 
Additionally, using return-oriented programming techniques the contained data can 
be abused in order to leak additional memory addresses. 
b) Information Disclosure: An information disclosure vulnerability can be used to 
leak memory locations of elements known to be at fixed addresses. For example, an 
out-of-bounds memory access vulnerability can be used to read a function pointer, 
and then send the value back to the remote server. Consequently, the server will 
control the size parameter of the function and accurately trigger an out-of-bounds 
read. As a result, the address of the public function is leaked. Based on this address, 
the memory layout of a corresponding executable file can be inferred. 
c) Heap Spraying: Heap spraying is a technique used to allocate a substantially 
large amount of memory and fill it with a concatenation of multiple copies of a block 
of data. This is intended to create heap blocks using scripting languages so that a 
reliable location can be attained, then execute shellcode without looking for an offset 
in the memory address. This can greatly increase the probability that a chosen 
address will point to the beginning of the block even in the presence of 
randomisation. 
2) Data Execution Prevention: Execution prevention [27][28] is another important 
countermeasure used to prevent arbitrary code execution even when an attacker has 
gained control over the processor’s instruction pointer. This technique marks 
memory regions of executable application or service as writable or executable, but 
not both at a time. Popularly known as DEP on Microsoft Windows systems, it utilizes 
a hardware feature of the processor known as the NX bit. This marks writable 
memory regions, including the stack, as nonexecutable. Thus, when an address from 
this memory region is loaded as the instruction pointer, the processor will notice the 
non-executable flag and then raises a kernel level exception. The kernel will then 
send a segmentation fault signal to the program and thus terminate the program. 
Techniques used to circumvent DEP include return into libc, Return-Oriented 
Programming (ROP) and stack pivoting. 
a) Return into libc: This technique [25] bypasses DEP by using the code of the 
running program or its shared libraries for malicious purposes instead of its intended 
use. This is achieved since the code is used by the running program itself, then the 
memory space utilised by the program is marked as executable. For example, in the 
Windows operating system an attack that uses WinExec and its functions (normally 
found in ntdll.dll) bypasses DEP as these are stored in an executable part of the 
memory. Thus malicious code can be copied to the executable memory space giving 
the attacker control of applications and services as described in [29]. 
b) Return-oriented Programming: This technique [25] allows an attacker to take 
control of the processor’s instruction pointer and the stack area where return 
addresses are stored. Small pieces of code called gadgets are chained together to 
execute a chosen functionality instead of executing the intended functions. These 
gadgets are simple instructions followed by a return statement. For example, the 
statement in Figure 2 moves the content of the stack esp to ecx and then loads the 
next address from the top of the stack into the processor’s instruction pointer 
through the return statement. This technique can successfully bypass DEP using 
WinExec as reported in [30]. 
c) Stack Pivoting: This technique [25] is an improvement of return-oriented 
programming by utilizing a special ROP gadget in order to make return-oriented 
programming possible through arbitrary overwrites. Having taken control of the 
processor’s instruction pointer, an attacker will use the pointer to jump to a gadget 
that modifies the stack pointer to make it point to a controlled location. This can be 
accomplished directly through an arithmetic operation or by gadgets containing the 
popq instruction. It is intended that the controlled stack area will contain the ROP 
shellcode that will be executed subsequently. 
3) Canaries: This is a compiler technique [31] that protects the stack by inserting 
a guard, a randomly chosen integer, at the start of the program between the protected 
region of the stack and the local buffers, i.e., a canary value is placed after the return 
address. Therefore, overwriting the return address will change the canary value, 
which is normally checked before a function uses the return address. The function 
will compare the value on the stack and the original value of the canary, if these 
values are different, then a message is generated in the system logs and the program 
will be terminated. 
 
B. The Windows XP Opportunity 
 
It has been estimated that Windows XP still constitutes 26% of all operating systems 
installed on desktop hosts [32]. As of the 8th April 2014, the extended support for 
Windows XP was discontinued. This meant that from this date there were no longer 
any security patches or support for this version of the operating system being made 
available for free. Although what is termed “critical patches” will be made available 
to paying customers. Additionally, after the 14th July 2015, the built-in anti-
malware tools, Security Essentials and the Malicious Software Removal Toolkit, will 
no longer be supported. Given this lack of support, if vulnerabilities are found in this 
version of the Windows operating system, it increases the likelihood that these 
systems will be susceptible to a future worm outbreak. This presents a particular 
issue, for instance, Slammer was able to cause disruption with less than 1% of the 
hosts at the time being susceptible to its infection vector [3], therefore it is reasonable 
that should a Windows XP vulnerability be exploited by a Slammer-like attack it 
could cause significant network disruption. 
 
VII. CONCLUSION 
 
Since the turn of the 21st century, zero-day worms have constituted a considerable 
threat to the Internet. Since 2005 there has been a reduction in the number of worm 
outbreaks, which can be attributed to a shift in the motivation of attackers from a 
period of experimentation and discovery to that of criminal activity. As such activity 
is better suited to the use of other types of malware, such as trojans, this reduction 
is reasonable. With the advent and increase in prevalence of cyberwarfare, worms 
once against become a weapon of choice for attackers, owing to their fast propagation 
and ability to cause considerable damage. 
This paper explored the contemporary availability of wormable vulnerabilities and 
discusses the increased proportion of susceptible hosts made available by 
exploiting operating system vulnerabilities, highlighting the common techniques 
used in order bypass the most common techniques for preventing the exploitation 
methods used by zero-day worms. Furthermore, it highlights the opportunity that 
has arisen for attackers with the end of extended support, and future end of anti-
malware support, for the Windows XP operating system. 
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